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This paper studies and bounds the effects of approximating loss functions and credal sets
on choice functions, under very weak assumptions. In particular, the credal set is assumed
to be neither convex nor closed. The main result is that the effects of approximation can be
bounded, although in general, approximation of the credal set may not always be practi-
cally possible. In case of pairwise choice, I demonstrate how the situation can be improved
by showing that only approximations of the extreme points of the closure of the convex
hull of the credal set need to be taken into account, as expected.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Classical decision theory tells a decision maker to choose that option which maximises his expected utility. A generalisa-
tion of this principle is compelling when the probabilities and utilities relevant to the problem are not well known. Choice
functions are one such generalisation, and select a set of optimal options: instead of pointing to a single solution based on
possibly wrong assumptions, choice functions provide a set of optimal options. The decision maker can then investigate fur-
ther if the set is too large, or not, if for instance the optimal set is a singleton, or if a single option from the set stands out from
the rest by other arguments.
However, in modelling decision problems, we often afford ourselves the luxury of inﬁnite spaces and inﬁnite sets,
making those problems sometimes hard to solve analytically. In such cases, we must resort to computers, and these cannot
handle random variables on inﬁnite spaces, let alone arbitrary inﬁnite sets of probabilities. Hence, in that case we must
approximate our inﬁnite sets by ﬁnite ones. By taking the ﬁnite sets sufﬁciently large, hopefully the approximation reﬂects
the true result accurately. This paper conﬁrms this intuition when modelling choice functions induced by arbitrary (not
necessarily convex) sets of probabilities and a single cardinal utility, extending similar results known in classical decision
theory [1,2].
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces notation, and brieﬂy reviews the theory of coherent choice func-
tions and their role in decision theory. In Section 3 the building blocks for a theory of approximation are introduced, along
with some useful results on what they imply for loss functions, sets of probabilities, and expected utility. The main part of
the paper begins in Section 4, studying and bounding the effects of approximation on coherent choice functions. Section 5
improves the results of the previous section for pairwise choice. Section 6 concludes the paper. Some essential but technical
results on approximating the standard simplex in Rn are deferred to an Appendix.. All rights reserved.
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Let X denote an arbitrary set of states. Bounded random quantities on X, i.e. bounded maps from X to R, are also called
gambles [3], and will be denoted by f ; g; . . .LðXÞ denotes the set of all gambles on X. Finitely additive probability measures,
or brieﬂy probability charges [4], are denoted by P, Q, . . . and PðXÞ denotes the set of all probability charges on the power set
}ðXÞ of X.
In a decision problem, we desire to choose an optimal option d from a set D of options. Choosing d induces an uncertain
reward r from a set R of rewards, with probability charge ldð j wÞ over }ðRÞ, depending on the outcome of the uncertain state
w 2 X. For each w 2 X, ldð j wÞ is a lottery over R, and as a function of w, ldð j Þ : w#ldð j wÞ is a horse lottery or act.
If we model our belief about states and rewards by a probability charge P on }ðXÞ and a state dependent utility function
Uð j wÞ on R, then utility theory [5–7] tells us to choose a decision d which maximises the expected utility, or prevision:EðdÞ ¼
Z
X
Z
R
UðrjwÞdldðrjwÞ
 
dPðwÞ ¼
Z
X
fdðwÞdPðwÞwhere fdðwÞ ¼
R
R Uðr j wÞdldðr j wÞ is the gamble associated with decision d, and the integrals are Dunford integrals [4]. For
simplicity, in this paper, we assume Uðr j wÞ to be bounded, i.e.
sup
r;w
UðrjwÞ  inf
r;w
UðrjwÞ < þ1Among other things, this ensures that relative approximation can be deﬁned, as in Section 3, without technical
complications.
A decision which maximises expected utility is called a Bayes decision for the decision problem ðX;D; P;UÞ.
However, if we are not sure about the probability of all events and the utility of all rewards, a more reliable design is to
use a family ðPa;UaÞa2@ of probability–utility pairs (where @ is an arbitrary index set), and to elicit from D those options
which maximise expected utility with respect to at least one of the pairs ðPa;UaÞ. First, for each a 2 @, letEaðdÞ ¼
Z
X
f ad ðwÞdPaðwÞwhere f ad ðwÞ ¼
R
R Uaðr j wÞdldðr j wÞ is the gamble associated with decision d and model a 2 @. Then we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1. A decision d 2 D is called an optimal decision for the decision problem ðX;D; ðPa;UaÞa2@Þ if d belongs to the setoptðX;D; ðPa;UaÞa2@Þ ¼ fd 2 D : ð9a 2 @Þð8e 2 DÞðEaðdÞP EaðeÞÞg ¼ d 2 D : ð9a 2 @Þ EaðdÞ ¼ sup
e2D
EaðeÞ
  As such, the operator opt selects a set of optimal decisions, namely all decisions which are Bayes with respect to ðX;D; Pa;UaÞ
for at least one a 2 @. Such an operator is called a choice function or optimality operator [8,9].
In case ðPa;UaÞa2@ ¼MU for some convex setsM and U, optimality as deﬁned above is also called E-admissibility [10,
Section 4.8].
There are many ways to deﬁne a choice function starting from a set ðPa;UaÞa2@ (see [3,9–12]). The one in Deﬁnition 1 sat-
isﬁes an interesting set of axioms [12,13], and is the subject of a representation theorem in case utility is precise and state
independent (i.e. if Uaðr j wÞ depends neither on a nor on w) and X is ﬁnite (for inﬁnite X the representation theorem is sub-
ject to additional constraints, which preclude merely ﬁnitely additive probabilities over X) [13].
For the sake of simplicity, we shall only be concerned about decision problems with precise and state independent utility
functions, i.e. when ðPa;UaÞa2@ ¼M fUg with U : R! R a bounded state independent utility over R andM ¼ fPa : a 2 @g
The setM is called a credal set as it represents our belief about w 2 X. We can identifyM itself as index set, and writeEPðdÞ ¼
Z
X
fdðwÞdPðwÞwith fdðwÞ ¼
R
R UðrÞdldðr j wÞ, for any P 2M.
Finally, deﬁning the loss function L : DX! R as Lðd;wÞ ¼ fdðwÞ, the expected value EPðdÞ is uniquely determined by P
and L alone: we need not be concerned explicitly with R, ldðr j wÞ, and UðrÞ.
3. Approximate gambles, probabilities, and previsions
LetA ¼ fA1; . . . ;Ang denote a ﬁnite partition of X. As we approximate X by the ﬁnite setA, we also need to approximate
decisions, gambles, and probability charges on X.
Let P 0. For a gamble f in LðXÞ and a gamble f^ in LðAÞ, we shall write f  f^ ifmax
A2A
sup
w2A
jf ðwÞ  f^ ðAÞj 6 ½sup f  inf f 
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spect to positive linear transformations of utility: it only depends on our preferences over lotteries, and not on our particular
choice of utility scale.
For a probability charge P in PðXÞ, and a probability charge P^ in PðAÞ, we shall write P  P^ ifTable 1
Upper b
Lemma
j D j
2
4
8
16
32X
A2A
jPðAÞ  P^ðAÞj 6 Note that this implies jPðAÞ  P^ðAÞj 6  for any A 2 }ðAÞ. Also note the differences between the deﬁnitions of  for gambles
and bounded charges.
For a loss function L on DX and a loss function L^ on DA we write L  L^ if for all d 2 Dfd  f^ d
(with fdðwÞ ¼ Lðd;wÞ and f^ dðAÞ ¼ L^ðd;AÞ).
For a subsetM of PðXÞ and a subset cM of PðAÞ, we writeM  cM if for every P inM there is a P^ in cM such that P  P^,
and for every P^ in cM there is a P inM such that P  P^.
A few useful results about approximations are stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. Assume that D is ﬁnite. Then, for every loss function L on DX and every  > 0, there is a ﬁnite partitionA of X and a
loss function L^ on DA such that L  L^ and jAj 6 ð1þ 1=ÞjDj.
Proof. Consider any d in D, and let Rd ¼ sup fd  inf fd. Because fd is bounded, we can embed the range of fd in k intervals
I1; . . . ; Ik of length Rd, say½inf fd; inf fd þ RdÞ; ½inf fd þ Rd; inf fd þ 2RdÞ; . . . ; ½inf fd þ ðk 1ÞRd; inf fd þ kRdÞwith k such that sup fd 2 Ik. Therefore, inf fd þ ðk 1ÞRd 6 sup fd < inf fd þ kRd and hence k 1 6 1= < k. Observe that k is
independent of d 2 D.
The sets A1; . . . ;Ak deﬁned byAj ¼ f1d ðIjÞ
form a ﬁnite partition Ad ¼ fAj : Aj–;g of cardinality jAdj 6 k 6 1þ 1= and the gamble f^ d 2LðAdÞ deﬁned byf^ dðAiÞ ¼ inf
w2Ai
fdðwÞsatisﬁessup
w2Aj
jfdðwÞ  f^ dðAjÞj ¼ sup
fdðwÞ2Ij
jfdðwÞ  inf
fdðwÞ2Ij
fdðwÞj 6 sup Ij  inf Ij ¼ Rdfor all Aj 2Ad; hence fd  f^ d. Deﬁning L^ðd;AÞ ¼ f^ dðAÞ for all d 2 D, we have L  L^.
The ﬁnite collection of partitions fAd : d 2 Dg has a smallest common reﬁnement A. Since each Ad has no more than
1þ 1= elements, A has no more than ð1þ 1=ÞjDj elements. Indeed, two partitions of cardinalities k1 and k2, respectively,
have a smallest common reﬁnement of cardinality no more than k1k2.
By induction, n partitions of cardinalities k1; . . . ; kn have a smallest common reﬁnement of cardinality no more thanQn
j¼1kj and hence,jAj 6 ð1þ 1=ÞjDj 
Table 1 lists upper bounds on the size of the partition, to ensure L  L^, for various values of  and j D j, according to
Lemma 2.ound on log10ðjAjÞ, i.e. the logarithm of the cardinality of the ﬁnite partition A for various values of precision  > 0 and number of decisions (see
2)

0.2 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01
1.6 2.1 2.6 3.4 4.0
3.1 4.2 5.3 6.8 8.0
6.2 8.3 10.6 13.7 16.0
12.5 16.7 21.2 27.3 32.1
24.9 33.3 42.3 54.6 64.1
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be the binomial coefﬁcient, deﬁned for all real numbers aP bP 0 by Table 2
Upper b
the par
jAj
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
log10ðjA
0.7
1.4
2.1
2.8
3.5
4.2
4.9a
b
¼ Cðaþ 1Þ
Cðbþ 1ÞCða bþ 1Þwith C the Gamma function.
Lemma 3. For every subsetM of PðXÞ, every d > 0, and every ﬁnite partitionA of X, there is a ﬁnite subset cM of PðAÞ such that
M d cM and jcMj 6 jAjð1þ 1=dÞjAj  1
 
.
Proof. Consider any P inM. Let n ¼ jAj and let the elements ofA be A1; . . . ;An. Consider the vector x ¼ ðPðA1Þ; . . . ; PðAnÞÞ in
Dn. Let N be the smallest natural number such that N P n=d.
By Lemma 13 in the Appendix, there is a vector y in DnN such thatjx yj1 < n=N 6 d
Deﬁne P^ in PðAÞ byP^ðAiÞ ¼ yi
for all i 2 f1; . . . ;ng—by ﬁnite additivity, P^ is well deﬁned on }ðAÞ. By construction, P d P^ becauseXn
i¼1
jPðAiÞ  P^ðAiÞj ¼ jx yj1 < dApproximating each P inM in this manner, the setM^ ¼ fP^ : P 2Mg
is ﬁnite as each of its elements corresponds to an element of the ﬁnite set DnN , and therefore jM^j 6 jDnNj. By Lemma 12 in the
Appendix,jM^j 6 N þ n 1
N
 
¼ N þ n 1
n 1
 
6
n=dþ 1þ n 1
n 1
 
¼ jAjð1þ 1=dÞjAj  1
 
 The second inequality follows from the fact that a
b
is strictly increasing in a, for ﬁxed b (for integer a and b this follows
immediately from Pascal’s triangle; the general case follows from the properties of the Gamma function).
Table 2 lists upper bounds on the cardinality of M^ on a logarithmic scale, for some values of jAj and d. The cardinality
grows enormously fast with increasing jAj and 1=d. Within the range of Table 2, an exponential trend is obvious. The table
shows that the inﬂuence of jAj is much larger than the inﬂuence of d: more precisely, doubling jAj increases jM^j by far more
than halving d. h
Next, we study the effect on the expectation if both gambles and probabilities are approximated. Let us use the notation
EPðf Þ ¼
R
X f ðwÞdPðwÞ. In the lemma below, assume 0 <  < 1=2.ound on log10ðjM^jÞ, i.e. the logarithm of the cardinality of the ﬁnite set of probability charges M^, for various values of precision d > 0 and cardinality of
tition jAj (see Lemma 3)
d
0.2 0.1 0.05
3.3 4.1 5.0
7.9 9.8 11.8
12.5 15.5 18.7
17.1 21.3 25.6
21.8 27.1 32.6
26.4 32.9 39.5
31.1 38.6 46.5
35.8 44.4 53.4
jÞ
4.4 5.5 6.7
27.6 34.3 41.3
144.6 179.5 215.5
731.3 906.8 1088.2
3666.1 4544.7 5452.8
18,341.5 22,735.9 27,277.5
91,719.7 113,693.0 136,402.5
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If f  f^ and P d P^ thenjEPðf Þ  EP^ðf^ Þj 6 ½sup f  inf f ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞ
andjEPðf Þ  EP^ðf^ Þj 6 ½sup f^  inf f^ 

1 2þ d
 Proof. Let R ¼ sup f  inf f , R^ ¼ sup f^  inf f^ , and write infAf for infw2Af ðwÞ and supAf for supw2Af ðwÞ. ThenjEPðf Þ  EP^ðf^ Þj ¼
X
A2A
Z
A
f dP  f^ ðAÞP^ðAÞ
 
and since PðAÞinfAf 6
R
A f dP 6 PðAÞsupAf , there is an rA 2 ½infAf ; supAf  such that PðAÞrA ¼
R
A f dP, and hence¼
X
A2A
ðrAPðAÞ  f^ ðAÞP^ðAÞÞ


but, because jf ðwÞ  f^ ðAÞj 6 R for all w 2 A, and infAf 6 rA 6 supAf , it must also hold that jrA  f^ ðAÞj 6 R, so
jPA2AðrAPðAÞ  f^ ðAÞPðAÞÞj 6PA2AjrA  f^ ðAÞjPðAÞ 6PA2ARPðAÞ ¼ R, whence6
X
A2A
ðf^ ðAÞPðAÞ  f^ ðAÞP^ðAÞÞ

þ R ¼ X
A2A
f^ ðAÞðPðAÞ  P^ðAÞÞ

þ R
and because
P
A2AðPðAÞ  P^ðAÞÞ ¼ 0,¼
X
A2A
ðf^ ðAÞ  inf f^ Þ PðAÞ  P^ðAÞ
 
þ R 6X
A2A
ðf^ ðAÞ  inf f^ ÞjPðAÞ  P^ðAÞj þ R 6 ðsup f^  inf f^ Þ
X
A2A
jPðAÞ  P^ðAÞj þ R
6 R^dþ R
and since Rð1þ 2ÞP R^P Rð1 2Þ6
Rð1þ 2Þdþ R ¼ Rðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞ
R^dþ R^=ð1 2Þ ¼ R^ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞ
(
Let us now investigate what is the most optimal choice for  > 0 and d > 0. The cardinality of M^ is of largest concern as it
grows enormously fast with increasing cardinality of the ﬁnite partition A and with increasing precision 1=d (see Table 2).
Therefore, as a ﬁrst step, let us see how we can minimise jM^j, assuming a ﬁxed relative error þ d on the expectation (see
Lemma 4)—omitting higher order terms in  and d to simplify the analysis.
We wish to minimise the upper bound (neglecting lower order terms)ð1=ðjDjdÞ
1=jDj
 !
on jM^j along the –d-curve cð; dÞ ¼ þ d ¼ c. Fig. 1 demonstrates a typical case: the –d-ratio has a large impact on the
upper bound of jM^j. In particular, the curve grows extremely large for small , because a small  corresponds to a large par-
tition A, and the cardinality of the partition has a huge impact on the cardinality ofM as shown in Table 2. hFig. 1. Upper bound on log10jM^j for various values of , with þ d ¼ 0:2 and j D j¼ 2.
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Let us now consider again the decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ with state space X, decision space D, credal setM, and loss
function L, and reﬂect upon how the results in the previous section could be of use in ﬁnding the optimal decisions
optðX;D;M; LÞ. Can we still ﬁnd the optimal decisions after approximating the loss function L and the set of probabilitiesM?
As we admit a relative error on gambles and probabilities, and therefore also on previsions, we should admit a relative
error on the choice function as well. Let RD be deﬁned by (recall that fdðwÞ ¼ Lðd;wÞ)RD ¼ sup
d2D
½sup fd  inf fdDeﬁnition 5. Let P 0. A decision d in D is called an -optimal decision for the decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ if it belongs to
the setoptðX;D;M; LÞ ¼ d 2 D : ð9P 2MÞ sup
e2D
EPðeÞ  EPðdÞ 6 RD
  Note thatoptðX;D;M; aLþ bÞ ¼ optðX;D;M; LÞ
for any real numbers a and b, a > 0. In other words, optðX;D;M; LÞ is invariant with respect to positive linear transforma-
tions of utility: -optimality does not depend on our choice of utility scale.
Clearly,optðX;D;M; LÞ#optðX;D;M; LÞbecauseoptðX;D;M; LÞ#optdðX;D;M; LÞ
whenever  6 d, andopt0ðX;D;M; LÞ ¼ optðX;D;M; LÞ
In approximating a decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ, we start with a ﬁnite partition A, consider a (possibly ﬁnite) set M^ such
thatM d M^, and approximate the loss Lðd;wÞ by a loss L^ðd;AÞ such that L  L^.
Theorem 6. Consider two decision problems ðX;D;M; LÞ and ðA;D; M^; L^Þ. If L  L^ andM d M^ then, for any cP 0,optcðX;D;M; LÞ#opt c12þ2 12þdð ÞðA;D; M^; L^Þ ð1Þ
andoptcðA;D;M^; L^Þ#optcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D;M; LÞ ð2ÞProof. We prove Eq. (1). Let d 2 optcðX;D;M; LÞ. Thensup
e2D
EPðfeÞ  EPðfdÞ 6 cRD ð3Þfor some P 2M. Let P^ be such that P d P^. Because, by Lemma 4,sup
e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  sup
e02D
EPðfe0 Þ
  6 sup
e2D
jEP^ðf^ eÞ  EPðfeÞj 6 sup
e2D
½sup f^ e  inf f^ eð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞ ¼ ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞR^D ð4Þit follows thatsup
e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  EP^ðf^ dÞ 6 sup
e2D
EPðfeÞ  EP^ðf^ dÞ þ ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞR^Dand again by Lemma 4,6 sup
e2D
EPðfeÞ  EPðfdÞ þ 2ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞR^Dand by Eq. (3),6 cRD þ 2ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞR^D 6 ½c=ð1 2Þ þ 2ð=ð1 2Þ þ dÞR^D
hence, d 2 optc=ð12Þþ2ð=ð12ÞþdÞðA;D; M^; L^Þ.
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e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  EP^ðf^ dÞ 6 cR^D ð5ÞBecause, by Lemma 4, 
sup
e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  sup
e02D
EPðfe0 Þ
  6 sup
e2D
jEP^ðf^ eÞ  EPðfeÞj 6 sup
e2D
½sup fe  inf feðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞ ¼ ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞRD ð6Þwe have thatsup
e2D
EPðfeÞ  EPðf Þ 6 sup
e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  EPðf Þ þ ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞRDand again by Lemma 4,6 sup
e2D
EP^ðf^ eÞ  EP^ðf^ eÞ þ 2ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞRDand by Eq. (5)6 cR^D þ 2ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞRD
6 ½cð1þ 2Þ þ 2ðþ dð1þ 2ÞÞRDso d 2 optcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D;M; LÞ.
If we ignore higher order terms in c, , and d, then the above theorem says that when moving from an original decision
problem to an approximate decision problem, or the other way around, with relative error  in gambles and relative error d in
probabilities, the relative error in optimality increases by 2ðþ dÞ. For example, for small  and d the following holds, up to a
small error: if L  L^ andM d M^, thenoptðX;D;M; LÞ#opt2ðþdÞðA;D; M^; L^Þ#opt4ðþdÞðX;D;M; LÞ
So, the approximate problem with relative error 2ðþ dÞ will contain all solutions to the original problem with no relative
error, and will, so to speak, not contain any solutions to the original problem with relative error over 4ðþ dÞ. Because of this
property, opt2ðþdÞðA;D; M^; L^Þ seems a logical choice when solving decision problems in practice. h
5. Pairwise choice
Table 2 reveals that the size of the credal set is a serious computational bottleneck. Therefore, it is worth investigating
how the size of M^ can be reduced, without compromising the accuracy d > 0. One way to this end is to restrict to pairwise
comparisons, i.e. using maximality (see Walley [3, Sections 3.7–3.9]).
5.1. Maximality
Deﬁnition 7. A decision d 2 D is called a maximal decision for the decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ if d belongs to the set
maxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼ fd 2 D : ð8e 2 DÞð9P 2MÞðEPðdÞP EPðeÞÞgDenote by coðMÞ the convex hull ofM. Obviously it holds that
maxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼maxðX;D; coðMÞ; LÞbecause for any k 2 ½0;1 and any two P and Q inM, the inequalities EPðdÞP EPðeÞ and EQ ðdÞP EQ ðeÞ imply the inequality
EkPþð1kÞQ ðdÞP EkPþð1kÞQ ðeÞThis does not hold for optimality as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1: assumingX ﬁnite, for any two distinct subsetsM andM0 ofPðXÞ,
we can always ﬁnd a set D and a loss function L such that optðX;D;M; LÞ–optðX;D;M0; LÞ (see Kadane et al. [12, Theorem 1, p.
53]).
Tounderstandwhy the abovenotionof optimality is calledmaximality, consider the strict partial ordering> onDdeﬁnedbye > d() ð8P 2MÞ EPðeÞ > EPðdÞð Þ
for any d and e in D, that is, e is strictly preferred to d if e is strictly preferred to d with respect to every P 2M. Then,maxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼ fd 2 D : ð8e 2 DÞðe dÞgso maxðX;D;M; LÞ elects those decisions d which are undominated with respect to >. Therefore, maximality can be ex-
pressed through pairwise preferences only—again in contrast to optðX;D;M; LÞ as for instance demonstrated by Kadane
et al. [12, Section 4, p. 51].
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we may interpret maxðX;D;M; LÞ as an approximation to optðX;D;M; LÞ, an approximation which discards all preferences
but the pairwise ones.
Let us admit a relative error on the choice function max as well. Recall, RD ¼ supd2D½sup fd  inf fd.
Deﬁnition 8. Let P 0. A decision d in D is called an -maximal decision for the decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ if it belongs to
the setmaxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼ fd 2 D : ð8e 2 DÞð9P 2MÞðEPðeÞ  EPðdÞ 6 RDÞg5.2. Approximating extreme points
It turns out that we can restrict our attention to the extreme points of the closure of the convex hull ofM, with respect to
the topology of pointwise convergence on members ofLðXÞ. This topology is characterised by the following notion of con-
vergence: for every directed set ðA;6Þ and every net ðPaÞa2A, we have that limaPa ¼ P iflim
a
EPa ðf Þ ¼ EPðf Þ for all f 2LðXÞWithout further mention, I will assume this topology on PðXÞ. See for instance [14] for more information regarding nets [14,
Chapter 7] and this topology [14, §28.15].
There is a nice connection between the closure ofM, denoted by clðMÞ, and -optimality and -maximality.
Lemma 9. Assume that RD > 0 and let P 0. For any decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ, the following equality holds:maxðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ ¼
\
d>0
maxþdðX;D;M; LÞ ð7Þand if additionally D is ﬁnite, then the following equality holds as well:optðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ ¼
\
d>0
optþdðX;D;M; LÞ ð8ÞProof. We start with proving Eq. (7).
Assume d 2 maxðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ. Consider any e 2 D. By assumption, there is a P 2 clðMÞ such that EPðeÞ  EPðdÞ 6 RD.
Because P 2 clðMÞ, there is a net ðPa 2MÞa2A such that limaEPa ðf Þ ¼ EPðf Þ for all gambles f. It follows that
limaEPa ðeÞ  limaEPa ðdÞ 6 RD. This implies that for every d > 0, there is an a 2 A such that EPa ðeÞ  EPa ðf Þ 6 ðþ dÞRD. So,
for every d > 0, there is a P 2M such that EPðeÞ  EPðf Þ 6 ðþ dÞRD. Whence, because this holds for any e 2 D,
d 2 maxþdðX;D;M; LÞ for all d > 0, and therefore, d 2 Td>0maxþdðX;D;M; LÞ.
Conversely, assume d 2 Td>0maxþdðX;D;M; LÞ. Consider any e 2 D. Then, for all d > 0, there is a Pd 2M such that
EPd ðeÞ  EPd ðf Þ 6 ðþ dÞRD. Hence, for all n 2 N, there is a Pn 2M such thatEPn ðeÞ  EPn ðdÞ 6 1=nþ RD ð9Þ
For any m 2 N, consider the following closed subset of PðXÞ:Rm ¼ clðfPn : nP mgÞ
The collection fRm : m 2 Ng satisﬁes the ﬁnite intersection property. By the Banach–Alaoglu–Bourbaki theorem [14, §28.29
(UF26)] PðXÞ is compact, and henceR ¼ \m2NRm
is non-empty as well [14, §17.2].
Take any R 2 R. Since each Pn 2M, it follows that each Rm# clðMÞ, and hence R 2 clðMÞ. If we can show that
ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 RD, then d 2 maxðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ is established.
Indeed, ﬁx m 2 N. Because R 2 Rm, there is a net ðPna Þa2A in fPn : nP mg—so na P m, but na is not necessarily an
increasing function of a—such that limaEPna ðfe  fdÞ ¼ ERðfe  fdÞ. Hence, for each c > 0, there is an a 2 A such that
ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 EPna ðeÞ  EPna ðdÞ þ c, and therefore by Eq. (9), ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 1=na þ RD þ c. Because this inequality holds for
every m and every c > 0, and na P m, it follows that ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 RD.
Let us now prove Eq. (8), under the additional assumption that D is ﬁnite. The proof goes along similar lines as the one for
Eq. (7).
Assume d 2 optðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ. By assumption, there is a P 2 clðMÞ such that EPðeÞ  EPðdÞ 6 RD for every e 2 D. Because
P 2 clðMÞ, there is a net ðPa 2MÞa2A such that limaEPa ðf Þ ¼ EPðf Þ for all gambles f. In particular, there is a net ðPa 2MÞa2A
such that limaEPa ðeÞ  limaEPa ðdÞ 6 RD for every e 2 D. So, for every e 2 D and d > 0, there is an ae;d 2 A such that
EPa ðeÞ  EPa ðf Þ 6 ðþ dÞRD for all aP ae;d. Because D is ﬁnite, there is an ad such that ad P ae;d for all e 2 D. Hence, for every
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d 2 optþdðX;D;M; LÞ for all d > 0, and therefore, d 2 Td>0optþdðX;D;M; LÞ.
Conversely, assume d 2 Td>0optþdðX;D;M; LÞ. Then, for all d > 0, there is a Pd 2M such that EPd ðeÞ  EPd ðf Þ 6 ðþ dÞRD
for every e 2 D. Hence, for all n 2 N, there is a Pn 2M such that for every e 2 DEPn ðeÞ  EPn ðdÞ 6 1=nþ RD ð10Þ
Now choose any R inR ¼ \m2NclðfPn : nP mgÞ
Similarly as before, it can be established that R is non-empty and that R 2 clðMÞ. If we can show that ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 RD for
all e 2 D, then d indeed belongs to optðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ and the desired result is established.
Indeed, because R 2 clðfPn : nP mgÞ, for every e 2 D, there is a net ðPna;e Þa2A in fPn : nP mg—so na;e P m—such that
limaEPna;e ðfe  fdÞ ¼ ERðfe  fdÞ. Hence, for every e 2 D and every c > 0, there is an a 2 A such that
ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 EPna;e ðeÞ  EPna;e ðdÞ þ c, and therefore by Eq. (10), ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 1=na;e þ RD þ c. Because this inequality
holds for every m and every c > 0, and na;e P m, it follows that ERðeÞ  ERðdÞ 6 RD for every e 2 D.
In particular, assuming RD > 0, if for any d >  > 0maxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼maxdðX;D;M; LÞ
thenmaxðX;D;M; LÞ ¼maxðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ
A similar result holds for the opt operator for ﬁnite D.
As a special case, Lemma 9 implies an interesting connection between maximality and -maximality. h
Corollary 10. Assume that RD > 0. For any decision problem ðX;D;M; LÞ, the following equality holds:
maxðX;D; clðMÞ; LÞ ¼
\
>0
maxðX;D;M; LÞAgain, a similar result holds for optimality and -optimality, in case D is ﬁnite.
In the following theorem, assume that 0 <  < 1=2.
Theorem 11. Consider two decision problems ðX;D;M; LÞ and ðA;D; M^; L^Þ. Assume that RD > 0. If L  L^ and
extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ d M^ then, for any cP 0,maxcðX;D;M; LÞ#
\
g>0
maxgþ
c
12þ2 12þdð ÞðA;D;M^; L^Þ ð11Þ
maxcðA;D;M^; L^Þ#
\
g>0
maxgþcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D;M; LÞ ð12ÞProof. First, note thatmaxcðX;D;M; LÞ ¼maxcðX;D; coðMÞ; LÞ#maxcðX;D; clðcoðMÞÞ; LÞ
and by convexity of clðcoðMÞÞ [14, §26.23] and the Krein–Milman theorem [15, p. 74], the closed convex hull of
extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ is clðcoðMÞÞ, so¼maxcðX;D; clðcoðextðclðcoðMÞÞÞÞÞ; LÞ
and now by Corollary 10,¼
\
g>0
maxcþgðX;D; coðextðclðcoðMÞÞÞÞ; LÞ ¼
\
g>0
maxcþgðX;D; extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ; LÞNow apply the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6 to recover Eq. (11).
To establish Eq. (12), again use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 6,maxcðA;D;M^; L^Þ#maxcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D; extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ; LÞ#maxcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D; clðcoðextðclðcoðMÞÞÞÞÞ; LÞand again by the Krein–Milman theorem [15, p. 74], the closed convex hull of extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ is clðcoðMÞÞ, so
¼maxcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D; clðcoðMÞÞ; LÞ ¼
\
g>0
maxgþcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D; coðMÞ; LÞ
¼
\
g>0
maxgþcð1þ2Þþ2ðþdð1þ2ÞÞðX;D;M; LÞ
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sion problem to the approximate decision problem, with relative error  in gambles and relative error d in probabilities, the
relative error in maximality increases by 2ðþ dÞ. Hence, for small  and d the following holds, up to a small error: if L  L^
and extðclðcoðMÞÞÞ d M^, thenmaxðX;D;M; LÞ#max2ðþdÞðA;D;M^; L^Þ#max4ðþdÞðX;D;M; LÞAgain, max2ðþdÞðA;D; M^; L^Þ seems a logical choice when calculating maximal decisions in practice. h
6. Conclusion and remarks
With this paper, I hope to have consolidated at least part of our every day intuition when approximating decision prob-
lems involving sets of probabilities, for instance when those problems have to be solved by computer.
One result is quite depressing: Lemmas 2 and 3 seem to tell us that except in the simplest cases, any approximation will
need too many resources to be of any practical value, as demonstrated by Tables 1 and 2.
Fortunately, not all is lost. If we resort to pairwise comparison, we may restrict ourselves to the extreme points of the
closure of the convex hull of the credal set, which can be much smaller than the original credal set. Closing the credal set
only has an arbitrary small effect on maximality, and in part for this reason, it turns out that approximating extreme points
sufﬁces when restricting to pairwise preference.
I wish to emphasise that the bounds on the cardinalities of the approximating partition and the approximating credal set
are only upper bounds under very weak assumptions. These bounds are only attained in extreme situations. In many cases
the credal set and the loss function have additional structure which may allow for much lower upper bounds.
In case the problem has sufﬁcient structure, an alternative approach is to develop algorithms which do not need to tra-
verse the complete credal set (or an approximation thereof) to compute the optimal solution. The imprecise Dirichlet model
has already been given considerable attention in this direction [16].
Obermeier and Augustin [17] have described a method to approximate decision problems by applying Luceños’ adaptive
discretisation method to either all elements of the credal set (so the partition varies with the distribution), or on a reference
distribution of that set. This type of approximation aims to preserve the ﬁrst r moments of a distribution. Although precise
convergence results and bounds on the precision of this approximation have not yet been proven, examples have shown that
this method can yield good results in practice.
Finally, another approach could consist of sampling elements from the credal set, for instance through Monte–Carlo tech-
niques, and solve a classical decision problem for each of these elements. If the sample s from M^ is large enough, then—sinceS
P2soptðA;D; P; LÞ ¼ optðA;D; s; LÞ—hopefullyoptðA;D;M; LÞ ¼
[
P2s
optðA;D; P; LÞThe question how large a sample we need to ensure convergence is deﬁnitely worth further investigation.
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Appendix A. Discretisation of the standard simplex in Rn
In this appendix a simple discretisation of Dn, the standard simplex in Rn, is studied—these results are not new and are in
fact related to well known notions from combinatorics, in particular multisets [18]. The standard simplex Dn is deﬁned asDn ¼ x 2 Rn : xP 0; jxj1 ¼ 1
	 
where j  j1 denotes the 1-norm, i.e. jxj1 ¼
Pn
i¼1jxij.
For any non-zero natural number N, let DnN denote the following ﬁnite subset of D
n:DnN ¼ fm=N : m 2 Nn; jmj1 ¼ Ng
(above, N is the set of natural numbers including 0).
Lemma 12. The cardinality of DnN is
N þ n 1
N
 
.
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taken from f1; . . . ;ng—for any m=N 2 DnN , interpret mi as the multiplicity of i. The number of all such multisets is precisely
N þ n 1
N
 
(see Stanley [18]). h
Lemma 13. For every x in Dn there is a y in DnN such thatjx yj1 < n=NProof. For each i 2 f1; . . . ;ng, letmi be the unique natural number such that xi 2 ½mi=N; ðmi þ 1Þ=NÞ, or equivalently, letmi be
the largest natural number such thatmi=N 6 xi. DeﬁneM ¼
Pn
i¼1mi. Then,M 6 N < M þ n sinceM=N ¼ jm=Nj1 6 jxj1 ¼ 1 and
ðM þ nÞ=N ¼ jðmþ 1Þ=Nj1 > jxj1 ¼ 1. Deﬁneei ¼
1 if i 2 f1; . . . ;N Mg
0 if i 2 fN M þ 1; . . . ; ng

and let y ¼ ðmþ eÞ=N. Note that y 2 DnN because j yj1 ¼j mþ ej1=N ¼ ðM þ ðN MÞÞ=N ¼ 1. Finally,jx yj1 ¼
XNM
i¼1
xi mi þ 1N
 þ Xn
i¼NMþ1
xi miN
  < n=Nas jxi  miþ1N j 6 1=N and jxi  miN j < 1=N. hReferences
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